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The ability to disqualify a judge from presiding over your case is an extraordinary right. In
California, there is more than one way to exercise that right, but the most controversial is C.C.P. §
170.6. Added to the California Code of Civil Procedure in 1957, the legislative intent behind §
170.6 was to enhance public confidence in the judicial system by giving attorneys the power to
disqualify a judge for prejudice absent any factual averments. Although the statute has served its
intended propose, its shortcomings have also allowed some attorneys to abuse it with impunity.
Under the statute, the only requirement for disqualification is for an attorney to have a good faith
belief that the judge assigned to his or her case is prejudiced against the attorney, the attorney’s
firm, or the attorney’s client. The thinking at the time of enactment was that if an attorney ever
faced a situation where he or she believed the assigned judge would not give the attorney a fair
chance at trial, he or she could disqualify the judge without having to provide specific
accusations. The absence of accusations allows disqualification to occur without offending the
judge being challenged. It also avoids any hearing where the judge’s dirty laundry could
potentially be aired. All the moving party must do for the challenge to be granted is to timely
submit, in good faith, a statement or an affidavit that asserts the judge is prejudiced.
The statute’s reliance on an attorney’s good faith belief about a judge’s prejudice and its potential
for abuse have raised alarm bells in the past. The constitutionality of § 170.6 was challenged and
upheld in Johnson v. Superior Court and Solberg v. Superior Court. The California Supreme Court
reasoned in both cases that because of the inherent difficulty of proving prejudice, an attorney’s
good faith accusations, even absent factual averments, were permissible. It also recognized that
the importance of avoiding even the suspicion of judicial partiality was paramount. The Court
further asserted that the allegations of abuse of the statute were no reason to find it
unconstitutional, and moreover, the risk of abuse was minimized by the safeguard mechanism
requiring attorneys to “show good faith by declaring under oath that the judge is prejudiced.”
Though I’m sure everyone can agree that the judiciary should do its utmost to preserve its
reputation of impartiality, I don’t think that the § 170.6 safeguard does nearly enough to prevent
abuse. The lack of an evidentiary burden makes it easy for attorneys to assert the challenge, but it
also makes it just as easy for them to abuse it. If an attorney isn’t prepared for trial, wants to
delay trial for strategic purposes, or wants to judge shop, § 170.6 can be used without question as
long as it is asserted in a timely fashion. The rule’s reliance on the good faith of attorneys makes it
an effective tool in any litigator’s arsenal, but it comes at the cost of allowing rampant and
unchecked exploitation.
One can certainly argue that § 170.6 does have a sufficient deterrent mechanism because
misusing it requires attorneys to perjure themselves. This view, however, fails to consider that
because § 170.6 requires no factual averments, an attorney who perjures himself or herself to
disqualify a judge has essentially zero chance of getting caught. If attorneys don’t face any real
threat of disciplinary action for abusing § 170.6, the temptation to misuse it may far outweigh the
guilt or shame he or she may feel for committing perjury.
The most serious side effect of the statute has inevitably been that judges who are completely
qualified to preside over their cases, and who are not biased, are benched at the whim of the
litigants in front of them. This was the exact reason § 170.6’s predecessor, C.C.P. § 170.5, was
found unconstitutional.
Section 170.5 was enacted in 1937 for much the same reasons as § 170.6. However, it differed
from § 170.6 because it did not require the filing of an affidavit, and in criminal cases could only
be asserted by the defense. In 1938, the statute was found to be unconstitutional because it
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permitted private citizens to unilaterally interfere with the power of the judicial branch to appoint
qualified judges to preside over cases. The California Supreme Court stated, “to put in the hands
of a litigant uncontrolled power to dislodge without reason or for an undisclosed reason, an
admittedly qualified judge from the trial of a case in which forsooth the only real objection to him
might be that he would be fair and impartial in the trial of the case would be to characterize the
statute not as a regulation but as a concealed weapon to be used to the manifest detriment of the
proper conduct of the judicial department.”

Andy Brunner-Brown

So how is § 170.6 any different? It isn’t really different at all, apart from the requirement of an
affidavit. In fact, many attorneys and judges will readily admit that the most frequent reasons for
using § 170.6 are indeed prohibited by the statute. One court went so far as to state, “it is
universally understood that the challenge is used mostly for purposes unrelated to bias or
prejudice of the judge.” This evidence of universal acceptance of off-label use of the statute
perfectly illustrates the ineffectiveness of the abuse deterrent mechanism.

Joanne Badua

What then can be done to preserve for litigants the right to disqualify a judge whom they truly
believe is biased, while at the same time sufficiently deter abuse of the statute? We simply need
to start keeping score.

Mark Heisey

The recording of every challenge and the review of challenges by an enforcement body would do
much more to deter abuse than the current reliance on good faith. Just like Santa’s naughty or
nice list, when you know somebody is keeping score you are much less likely to break the rules.
First, there needs to be a database that records peremptory challenges. Currently there is no way
to analyze the use of the statute, making it essentially impossible to find instances of abuse
outside of anecdotal evidence. Having a database that records which attorney or law firm brings
the challenge, and which judge is disqualified, is essential to begin reigning in abuse. Each court
in California could easily submit the name of the attorney, law firm, and challenged judge to a
centralized database. This would put little burden on the courts and help them greatly with
backlogs caused by challenges.
Second, there needs to be a third-party monitoring body. This entity could analyze the database
for patterns of abuse and investigate suspicious challenges. The California Bar could carry out this
task, which would be in accord with its role in ensuring attorneys meet their professional
obligations. When an attorney or law firm is found to have a suspicious assortment of challenges
to multiple judges, an analyst could flag the attorney or law firm and further investigate to
determine if § 170.6 has been abused.
As the legal profession adapts to the new technologies of the twenty-first century, it should not
hesitate to use these new tools to help correct the imperfections of the past. C.C.P. § 170.6 is one
of many rules that could use database analytics to cure its shortcomings, and doing so would be a
step in the right direction.
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